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CONCEPTUALIZING THE REGULATION OF
VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND PROVIDERS:
FRICTION POINTS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
APPROACHES TO REGULATING PROVIDERS OF
PAYMENTS EXECUTION AND CUSTODY
SERVICES AND PRODUCTS IN THE UNITED
STATES
SARAH JANE HUGHES*
ABSTRACT
This essay evaluates the state of regulation by the United States government and
State legislatures of participants in emerging virtual-currency businesses. It points to
friction points as both the federal government and the States experiment with their
own regulatory authority over virtual-currency businesses and provides a taxonomy
of differing approaches to regulating such businesses. The essay takes the position that
the States need to act in the near term if they wish to maintain their longstanding role
as regulators of non-depository providers of financial products and services—or they
risk being preempted by Congress or federal regulatory actions. This essay also
suggests that regulating providers of virtual-currency products and services is a course
preferable to regulating the products and services themselves.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Virtual currencies have been around much longer than current discussions of these
technologies, or their regulation, would suggest. Virtual currencies emerged as ecommerce did, taking off in the mid-1990s.1
* Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial Law at the Maurer
School of Law at Indiana University. She appreciates the opportunity to share this essay with
readers of the Cleveland State Law Review, and the invitation of Professor Brian Ray and the
editors of the Law Review to participate in the April 2018 Blockchain Law and Technology
Symposium. Professor Hughes wishes readers to be aware that she served as the Reporter for
the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act
(2017), a product of collaboration between Uniform Law Commissioners and many
stakeholders, as well as for the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Supplemental
Commercial Law Act for the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act (2018).
As Reporter, she admits she cannot contain her enthusiasm for the Act’s exemptions and
“registration” sandbox. Professor Hughes can be reached at sjhughes@indiana.edu. SSRN
author page, http://ssrn.com/author =408848.
1 See Ian Grigg, A Quick History of Cryptocurrencies BBTC – Before Bitcoin,
BITCOINMAGAZINE (Apr. 16, 2014), https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/quick-historycryptocurrencies-bbtc-bitcoin-1397682630/ (reprinted from financialcryptography.com). For
some additional analysis, see Steven Levy, E-Money – That’s What I Want, WIRED (Dec. 1,
1994) [hereinafter E-Money], https://www.wired.com/1994/12/emoney/ (describing early
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Virtual currencies did not become part of wider discussions—and the term “the
blockchain” was little heard of—until the publication of Satoshi Nakamoto’s famous
paper entitled A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System in 2009.2 Nakamoto’s paper
introduced us to Bitcoin and the public ledger associated with it, known as “the
blockchain.”3
Bitcoin and other virtual currencies that followed were seen by some as a means
of proofing e-commerce payments against the “double-spending” and counterfeit
problems that Internet -based payments without separate verification platforms can
pose,4 and preserving anonymity in payments that are similar to cash. 5
Since 2009, government interest in regulating virtual currencies, blockchain
technologies, and providers of both currencies and services related to them, has grown
as the types of transactions and the types of regulatory challenges that certain
technologies and providers bring into governments’ scrutiny. 6
We stand at a friction point in the regulation of virtual currencies, blockchain
technologies, providers of virtual-currency, and other blockchain-based products and
services—and perhaps all “fintech” or “financial technology” enterprises. 7 This
friction point involves what appear to be competing regulatory priorities and
approaches rather than one point of disagreement.8 These competing approaches cover
many concerns that emerged as e-commerce developed more than 20 years ago,
particularly regarding whether to allow e-commerce to avoid or comply with extant
regulatory obligations and, more specifically, how to regulate them. The recurrence of
similar issues of how and to what extent governments should regulate this new
technology, and which governments and government agencies should play the single
lead role or how to parcel out the regulation of virtual currencies, technologies, and
providers among governments and agencies with logical and historical connections to
the regulation of the issues that virtual currencies and related new technologies, should
help inform important regulatory decisions in the near and medium terms.
This essay looks at this regulatory friction through the lens of numerous competing
approaches to the regulation of providers of virtual-currency payments and storage
participants in the e-money marketplaces and the efforts of cryptographic pioneers David
Chaum of Digicash and others).
2

Satoshi Nakamoto, A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN (2008),
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf.
3

See
Nolan
Bauerle,
What
Is
Blockchain
Technology,
COINDESK
https://www.coindesk.com/information/what-is-blockchain-technology/ (last visited Oct. 3,
2018). Readers unfamiliar with blockchain technology will find this explanation particularly
useful.
4

See Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 1.

5

See E-Money, supra note 1. For the original explanation of the privacy feature in Bitcoin,
see Nakamoto, supra note 2, at 6.
6 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, CRYPTOCURRENCIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE HYPE (June
17, 2018), https://www.bis.org/publ/arpdf/ar2018e5.pdf.
7

Andrew Norry, An In-Depth Look at Bitcoin Laws & Future Regulation, BLOCKONOMI
(July 2, 2018), https://blockonomi.com/bitcoin-regulation/.
8 Gareth W. Peters et al., Trends in Cryptocurrencies and Blockchain Technologies: A
Monetary Theory and Regulation Perspective, 3 EY GLOBAL FIN. SER. INST. 1, 37 (2015).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

3

2019] CONCEPTUALIZING THE REGULATION OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES AND PROVIDERS

43

products and services in the U.S. marketplace in 2018. These include, in reverse
chronological order,9 the July 31, 2018 issuance of the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency’s Policy Statement on Fintech Charters, 10 the July 31, 2018 report from
the Department of the Treasury entitled “A Financial System That Creates Economic
Opportunities—Nonbank Financials, Fintech, and Innovation,”11 the Bureau of
Consumer Financial Protection’s July 2018 announcement that it would use its Office
of Innovation to explore regulation of virtual currencies with non-domestic
regulators,12 the launch of the State of Arizona’s “regulatory sandbox” for fintech
companies,13 amendments to state “money transmitter” regulatory statutes,14 the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors’ pilot program for reciprocal licensure, 15 the
Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses
Act,16 and the BitLicense regulation promulgated by the New York State Department
of Financial Services in 2015.17 Additional sources of friction include the approaches
that the Securities and Exchange Commission and Commodities Futures Trading

9 The analysis presented in later parts of this essay does not proceed on the same reverse
chronological basis. Rather, it proceeds with the approaches taken by the States to date and the
visions articulated by the Department of the Treasury and Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency by classifying the approaches into a rough taxonomy.
10 OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, POLICY STATEMENT ON FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES’ ELIGIBILITY TO APPLY FOR NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS (July 31,
2018) [hereinafter OCC POLICY STATEMENT], https://www.occ.gov/publications/publicationsby-type/other-publications-reports/pub-other-occ-policy-statement-fintech.pdf.
11 U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., REPORT: A FINANCIAL SYSTEM THAT CREATES ECONOMIC
OPPORTUNITIES -- NONBANK FINANCIALS, FINTECH, AND INNOVATION (July 31, 2018)
[hereinafter 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT], https://home.treasury.gov/sites/default/files/201807/A-Financial-System-that-Creates-Economic-Opportunities---Nonbank-Financi....pdf.
12 Press Release, Bur. of Cons. Fin. Prot., BCFP Collaborates with Regulators Around the
World to Create Global Financial Innovation Network (Aug. 7, 2018) [hereinafter BCFP Global
Network Press Release], https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/bcfpcollaborates-regulators-around-world-create-global-financial-innovation-network/.
13

H.R. 2434, 53rd Leg., 2nd Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2018) [hereinafter Arizona Fintech Bill]
(amending Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-1491.10, adding Chapter 55 to Ariz. Rev. Stat., amending Ariz.
Rev. Stat. § 44-1531.01).
14 See Justin S. Wales, State Regulation on Virtual Currency and Blockchain Technologies,
CARLTONFIELDS
(June
28,
2018),
https://www.carltonfields.com/insights/publications/2018/state-regulations-on-virtualcurrency-and-blockcha.
15 CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS TAKE FIRST STEP TO
STANDARDIZE LICENSING PRACTICES FOR FINTECH PAYMENTS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practices-fintechpayments.

UNIF. L. COMM’N, UNIFORM REGULATION OF VIRTUAL-CURRENCY BUSINESSES ACT (July
19, 2017), www.uniformlaws.org (final text of the act, the prefatory note, and comments
published in October 2017).
16

17

23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200 (2015) (effective Aug. 8, 2015).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8

4

44

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:40

Commission have taken, which are not the focus of this essay. 18 Friction in this
environment also arises as other nations—such as Malta19 and Singapore20—start to
stake out their positions on virtual-currency providers.
The approach preferred by the virtual-currency and blockchain communities may
be to have no regulations governing their activities, but that approach is increasingly
unrealistic given the volumes of activity by third-party providers of virtual-currency
products and services and domestic and global value flows in virtual currencies. This
don’t-regulate-us approach also is out of sync with the history of regulating payments
and currency in the United States—a history back to Colonial Times. 21 Under this
don’t-regulate-us approach, the United States would fail a core challenge in the
Treasury’s 2018 Fintech Report—to find ways to harmonize regulation and work
together to improve our regulatory marketplace.
Part II of this essay describes these divergent regulatory approaches with a focus
on providers of virtual-currency products and services that are exchanges, wallet
providers, centralized issuers, and custodians in the United States. 22 This Part does not
proceed in the same reverse chronological basis as mentioned in Part I. Rather, it
addresses categories of proposed and extant regulatory approaches taken such as
federal bank charters, state bank or industrial loan company charters, full licensure in
individual states, reciprocal state licensure, regulatory sandboxes and other innovation
incentives, and other models, offering readers a preliminary taxonomy of regulatory
choices.
Part III explains why start-ups need a safe “location” from which to test products
and grow. Consider the two-year permissioned “sandbox” option the State of Arizona
adopted on July 1, 201823 or the dollar-limited, non-permissioned “registration” option
included in the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency

18 The regulation of cryptocurrencies as securities or commodities is the subject of
numerous works in progress. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and
the Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018); Melanie
L. Fein, Bitcoin: How Is It Regulated? (June 29, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166894.
19

See, e.g., Jimmy Aki, Malta Approves Favorable Cryptocurrency Bills in Next Step as a
Blockchain
Island,
BITCOINMAGAZINE
(June
29,
2018),
https://bitcoinmagazine.com/articles/malta-passes-favorable-cryptocurrency-laws-next-stepblockchain-island/ (note that the correction explanation suggests that these bills passed only one
organ of government and need final approval).
20 See Samburaj Das, Singapore Mulls New Rules to Safeguard Cryptocurrency, ICO
Investors, CCN.COM (March 1, 2018), https://www.ccn.com/singapore-explores-new-rulessafeguard-cryptocurrency-investors/ (reporting that Singapore’s Monetary Authority is
considering bringing cryptocurrency providers under its Payment Services Bill in 2018).
21 See Stephen T. Middlebrook & Sarah Jane Hughes, Substitutes for Legal Tender: Lessons
from History for the Regulation of Virtual Currencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON ELECTRONIC
COMMERCE LAW 37 (John A. Rothchild ed., Edward Elgar 2016).
22 This essay does not analyze the potential effects of the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau’s final rule, Rules Concerning Prepaid Accounts under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act
(Regulation E) and the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 83 Fed. Reg. 6364 (Feb. 13, 2018),
codified at 12 C.F.R. Parts 1005 and 1026.
23

Arizona Fintech Bill, supra note 13, at § 41-5602.
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Businesses Act (“URVCBA”), but not yet enacted or implemented in any state. 24 The
availability of incubators is not contrary to views expressed in the Treasury’s 2018
Fintech Report.25 These pro-innovation incubator options contrast with states that are
focused on amending already non-uniform money-transmitter statutes to include
providers of virtual-currency payment products and services. 26 These moneytransmitter amendments do not include, at least for now, equivalents of Arizona’s
sandbox, the ULC’s full-exemption and “registration” statuses, or the OCC’s specialpurpose or full-fledged national bank charters. 27
Part IV discusses another source of friction, or at least concern, for virtual-currency
providers—the risks of being prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 for being unlicensed
by the states in which they do business or not registered with Treasury’s Financial
Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”). This Part also explains why virtualcurrency businesses should ensure that they comply with existing anti-moneylaundering (“AML”) and Office of Foreign Asset Controls (“OFAC”) requirements,
as well as meeting their state-license compliance responsibilities. Part V offers some
conclusions.
II. FRICTION: COMPETING REGULATORY APPROACHES ADVANCED IN THE UNITED
STATES SINCE 2015
A major, if not the major, source of friction in the licensure and regulation of
virtual-currency businesses in the United States stems from the rapidly multiplying
approaches to these issues at the federal and state levels. 28 This Part of this essay offers
readers a taxonomy of regulatory approaches that are being used or may be available
to third-party providers of virtual-currency products and services in the United States
based on options that appear to be available as of July 31, 2018. It includes analysis
of the Treasury’s July 31, 2018 Fintech Report and of the Comptroller’s July 31, 2018
Policy Statement on Financial Technology Companies’ Eligibility to Apply for
National Bank Charters, as well as of various state approaches.
A. Federal Bank Charters and Special-Purpose National Bank Charters
On July 31, 2018, the Comptroller of the Currency issued a Policy Statement 29 and
a supplement to the Comptroller’s Licensing Manual30 announcing that it would take

24

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 207.

25

2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 66–68, 167–69 (respectively, praising
states as laboratories for innovation and advocating flexible regulatory regimes with options
other than approval and disapproval, and “meaningful experimentation in the real world, subject
to appropriate limitations”).
26 For discussion of specific states’ approaches, see infra Part II. Additional analysis is
offered in Trautman, supra note 18, at 42–48.
27

OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10.

28

Mark Burge, Apple Pay, Bitcoin, and Consumers: The ABCs of Future Public Payments
Law, 67 HASTING L. J. 1493, 1493 (2016).
29

OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10.

30 OCC, COMPTROLLER’S LICENSING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT: CONSIDERING CHARTER
APPLICATIONS
FROM
FINANCIAL
TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES
(2018),
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applications for charters under its National Bank Act 31 authority. The options
specifically include “special purpose national bank charters” and full national bank
charters. The announcement32 suggests that applicant must be engaged in “the business
of banking.”33 The announcement also explained that “the business of banking”
includes three functions—taking deposits, paying checks, and lending money. 34
Entities that “take deposits” will need to obtain federal deposit insurance from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation in addition to their OCC charters before they
can commence business.35 Entities that pay checks or lend money, or both, without
taking deposits have not been required to hold bank charters or to have federal deposit
insurance. These entities have been regulated by the states as check cashers 36 or
licensed lenders37 unless they held “special purpose bank charters.”38
“Special purpose banks” were limited to trust banks, banker’s banks, and credit
card banks39 until the Comptroller began to explore chartering fintech companies as
special purpose banks in 2016.40 The Comptroller’s July 31, 2018 Policy Statement
continued to cite the existing regulation codified at 12 C.F.R. § 5.20 for the scope of
potential authority for new fintech special-purpose banks.41 In a now-dismissed
https://www.occ.treas.gov/publications/publications-by-type/licensing-manuals/file-pub-lmconsidering-charter-applications-fintech.pdf.
31

National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (1988).

32 Press Release, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC begins Accepting
National Bank Charter Applications from Financial Technology Companies (July 31, 2018)
[hereinafter NR 2018-74], https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/2018/nr-occ2018-74.html.
33

Id.; 12 U.S.C. §§ 21, 26 (1982).

34

NR 2018-74, supra note 32; 12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i) (2015). It may become important
to remember that physical locations at which a bank performs all three functions constitutes a
“branch,” a status that implicates other considerations under § 36(j) of the National Bank Act.
12 U.S.C. § 36(j) (2000).
35

12 U.S.C. § 1811 (2006).

See UNIF. L. COMM’N, CURRENT STATE REGULATION OF NONDEPOSITORY PROVIDERS OF
FINANCIAL
SERVICES
(“NDPS”),
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/money%20services/ndpnbfi.pdf (last visited Oct. 5,
2018).
36

37

Id.

38

12 C.F.R. § 5.20(e)(1)(i).

39

NR 2018-74, supra note 32; 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841(c)(2)(D) and (F) (2010). For a more
complete statement of the history and scope of these provisions, see Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285, 291–94 (D.D.C. 2018).
40
Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at the Georgetown University
Law Center: Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies (Dec. 2, 2016),
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub-speech-2016-152.pdf;
OCC,
EXPLORING SPECIAL PURPOSE NATIONAL BANK CHARTERS FOR FINTECH COMPANIES (2016),
https://www.occ.gov/topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bankcharters-for-fintech.pdf.
41

OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10.
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challenge to the Comptroller’s 2017 plans to charter fintech companies, 42 the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors argued that these traditional types of specialpurpose banks are the only types of special-purpose charters the Comptroller may
grant.43
All fintech charter applicants, the announcement explained, “will be supervised
like similarly situated national banks,” 44 will need to hold capital, demonstrate
liquidity, to make financial inclusion commitments appropriate to their business
plans,45 to submit “acceptable contingency” plans for “significant financial stress that
could threaten the viability of the bank,” 46 and should expect to be subject to
“heightened supervision initially, similar to other de novo banks.” 47
The Comptroller’s announcement has energized some participants in the virtualcurrency community to imagine that they could obtain nationwide authority without
the necessity of obtaining licenses as money transmitters or money services businesses
in all jurisdictions that require them. As the Complaint filed by the CSBS notes, such
charters free charter-holders from many state laws beyond those requiring state
licensure.48
The prospect of special-purpose bank charters likely tantalizes virtual-currency
companies as well as those in the broader range of fintech companies. However, the
OCC’s July 31, 2018 Policy Statement suggests that it will impose high standards and
will look favorably on applicants that “[have] a reasonable chance of success, will be
operated in a safe and sound manner, will treat customers fairly, and will comply with
applicable laws and regulations.”49 The Policy Statement also explained that the OCC
will not approve “proposals that include financial products and services that have
predatory, unfair, or deceptive features or that pose risk to consumer protection[.]”50
Thus, it is clear that the OCC will not be chartering every applicant for a specialpurpose bank charter. Indeed, the OCC’s proposed special-purpose bank charters
require advance permission.51 Given the high hurdles in the criteria explained above,
this appears to be intended only for applicants with substantial capital and the ability
to manage the application process.

42 Conference of State Bank Supervisors, 313 F. Supp. 3d at 301–02 (dismissing case on
lack of standing grounds). The challenge brought by the New York State Department of
Financial Services was dismissed on December 20, 2017. Vullo v. OCC, No. 17 Civ. 3574
(NRB), 2017 WL 6512245, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2017).
43

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at ¶¶ 6, 31–46, Conference of State Bank
Supervisors v. OCC, 313 F. Supp. 3d 285 (D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-CV-00763).
44

NR 2018-74, supra note 32.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 43, at ¶ 11.

49

OCC POLICY STATEMENT, supra note 10, at 3.

50

Id. at 3–4.

51

See 12 U.S.C. § 27(a) (1988) (certificate of authorization before commencing banking).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8

8

48

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:40

B. State Bank Charters or Industrial Loan Company Charters
States also charter banks and industrial loan companies (“ILCs”). 52 State-chartered
banks need advance approval before they open for business from both the state’s
chartering authority and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.53 State-chartered
banks are subject to the same limitations on their ownership—to preserve the
separation of banking and commerce observed in the United States at least since the
Banking Act of 193354 and the Securities Act of 1933.55 Thus, state-chartered banks
are in the advance-permission, high-hurdle situations such as federally chartered banks
with limitations on their ownership.
Industrial loan companies have powers like those enjoyed by state-chartered
banks; they also need advance state approvals and FDIC approval.56 However, an
important difference is that owners of ILC applicants are not subject to the federal
Bank Holding Company Act.57 Thus, commercial firms can apply for industrial-loan
company charters and some have. In 2017, for example, two fintech companies
applied for ILC permissions: Social Finance (known as “SoFi Bank”) and Square,
Inc.58 Square’s ILC application with Utah remains active, but Square withdrew its
FDIC application “temporarily” in June 2018.59

52 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-08-751, INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS
(2005).
53 How Can I Start a Bank?, BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM,
https://www.federalreserve.gov/faqs/banking_12779.htm (last updated Aug. 2, 2013).
54

Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (also known as the
Banking Act of 1933).
55 Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77(a)
(1994).
56 For a comprehensive review of the FDIC’s authority to supervise industrial loan
companies, see Mindy West, The FDIC’s Supervision of Industrial Loan Companies: A
Historical
Perspective,
FED.
DEP.
INS.
CORP.
(2004),
https://www.fdic.gov/regulations/examinations/supervisory/insights/sisum04/sisummer04article1.pdf.
57

Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1852 (1994); West, supra note 56.

See Application Status, UTAH DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., https://dfi.utah.gov/generalinformation/application-status/ (last updated Nov. 30, 2017); Cinar Oney, Fintech Industrial
Banks and Beyond: How Banking Innovations Affect the Federal Safety Net, 23 FORDHAM J.
CORP & FIN. L. 541 (2018). For more discussion, see, Kevin Petrasic et al., Fintech Companies
and Bank Charters: Options and Considerations for 2018, WHITE & CASE (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/fintech-companies-and-bank-charters-optionsand-considerations-2018.
58

59 See Michelle Price, Payments Processor Square Inc. Withdraws Banking Application:
Statement, REUTERS (July 5, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-square-fdiclicense/payments-processor-square-inc-withdraws-banking-license-application-statementidUSKBN1JV2XG.
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C. States Offering Only Pre-Approved Full Licensure to Non-Bank Providers
Including Virtual-Currency Businesses
States require licenses prior to engaging in certain types of financial services
activities, particularly when their counter-parties are consumers.60 Lending money is
one such financial service that requires a license from all states.61 The range of services
includes mortgage-lending, automobile financing, and other small-dollar loan
products.62 Another service for which states generally require licensure is traditionally
known as “money transmission.”63 This category includes sending money from one
consumer to another or from one location to another without engaging a bank to
complete the transaction and “payment processing,” a term that covers credit-anddebit-card processing for merchants and payroll services.64 All states, except Montana,
have statutes governing “money transmission.”65 These types of state laws normally
exclude depositary institutions—banks and credit unions—from their scope.66
State license applications are also relatively costly and time-consuming. For
example, the Texas Department of Banking requires a non-refundable application fee
of $10,000 for money transmission licenses ($5,000 for currency-exchange-only
applications).67 In addition, the Texas Department of Banking requires surety bonds
for money transmission ranging from $300,000 to $2 million, or a deposit or letter-ofcredit substitute, and net worth ranging from $100,000 (for four or fewer locations in
Texas) to a minimum for five or more locations of $500,000.68 The time required to
get a license varies, but there are reports of periods of one to two years. 69 Application
processes have generated complaints from stakeholders in the past.70 The press release
60

Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Disrupting Fintech Law, 18 FINTECH L. REP. 1, 18 (2015).

61

Id.

62

See Types of Loans: What Are The Differences?, VALUEPENGUIN
https://www.valuepenguin.com/loans/types-of-loans (last visited Oct. 13, 2018).
63 Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You
Ready To Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211, 1250 (2016).
64

See id. at 1252.

65

See THOMAS BROWN, CAL. STATE ASSEMB., COMM. ON BANKING & FIN., 50-STATE
SURVEY: MONEY TRANSMITTER LICENSING REQUIREMENTS (2013).
66 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-208.42(7) (2016) (stating the definition of a “depository
institution”); see § 53-208.44 (explaining the exemptions for persons required to have a money
transmitter license to engage in business in North Carolina).

See TEX. DEP’T OF BANKING, GENERAL APPLICATION REQUIREMENTS,
http://www.dob.texas.gov/applications-forms-publications/general-application-requirements
(last updated Sept. 2017).
67

68

Id.

69
Faisal Khan, How Difficult Is It to Get a Money Transmitter License for Texas?, QUORA
(Jan. 12, 2016), https://www.quora.com/How-difficult-is-it-to-get-a-money-transmitterlicense-for-Texas.
70 See THOMAS BROWN, supra note 65; see generally Bloomberg Law, Money Transmitter:
Licensing
Guidance,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/bankfinance/page/bf_money_transmitter_guidance
(last visited Sept. 27, 2018).
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announcing the State of Arizona’s new “regulatory sandbox,” described in a later
subpart of this essay, stated:
Currently, it can take a startup several months and tens of thousands of
dollars in fees, compliance costs, and legal expenses to navigate the
regulatory maze in just one state. This slow-moving and expensive process
is unacceptable in an industry like fintech that is rapidly changing and
developing.71
Licensure requirements in the United States vary a great deal. Some states
amended their money transmission statutes to reach providers of virtual-currency
products and services.72 For example, North Carolina amended its statutory definition
of “money transmission” in 2016 73 to include “maintaining control of virtual currency
on behalf of others,” and to define “virtual currency.” 74 Washington State similarly
amended its Money Services Act to included virtual currency. 75 Washington also
excludes banks and credit unions from its statute. 76 Other states have not regulated
virtual-currency providers yet, for example, South Carolina.77
Like bank and ILC charter holders, state money transmission and money services
statutes take an all-or-nothing approach to regulating virtual-currency providers.78 If
the business activity meets the statutory definition, then the business must have a
license before it offers its products or services to the public.79 Unlicensed activity is
met with the prospect of criminal prosecutions and penalties. 80

71 Press Release, Ariz. Att’y Gen., Ariz. Becomes First State in U.S. to Offer Fintech
Regulatory Sandbox (Mar. 23, 2018) [hereinafter Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press
Release],
https://www.azag.gov/press-release/arizona-becomes-first-state-us-offer-fintechregulatory-sandbox.
72 Dale A. Werts & Tedrick A. Housh III, Blockchain and Cryptocurrency: State Law
Roundup, LATHROP GAGE (July 9, 2018), https://www.lathropgage.com/newsletter-239.html.
73

N.C. GEN. STAT., § 53.208.42(13) (2016).

74

Id. § 53.208.42(20).

75 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230 (2017). For a listing of virtual-currency licensees in
Washington State, see DEP’T OF FIN. INSTS., LICENSEE LIST – VIRTUAL CURRENCY,
http://www.dfi.wa.gov/sites/default/files/documents/virtual-currency-licensee-list.pdf
(last
updated Sept. 5, 2018).
76

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.020 (2017).

77 Heather Morton, Cryptocurrency 2018 Legislation, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES
(July 5, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/cryptocurrency2018-legislation.aspx.
78 See PETER VAN VALKENBURGH, THE NEED
MONEY TRANSMISSION LICENSING 3 (2018).
79

FOR A

FEDERAL ALTERNATIVE

TO

STATE

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.030; id. § 19.230.010(17)–(19).

80 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.230.300 (criminal penalties); N.C. GEN. STAT §
53-208.58(c) (2016) (criminal penalties for engaging in business without first obtaining a
license).
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D. Efforts to Increase Reciprocal Recognition of Licenses Issued by Other States
Including a Pilot Reciprocity Program to Increase Harmonization of Licensing,
Regulations, and Examinations
Efforts to reduce barriers between and among state licensure requirements since
2016 have come in two forms: enhanced coordination in licensing and supervision and
proposed legislation that specifically encourages reciprocal licensure.81 Both forms
use the CSBS’ Nationwide Mortgage Licensing System. 82 This subpart of this essay
looks at both approaches as alternatives to federal preemption of state regulations
relating to virtual-currency business licensure, regulation, and examination—
preemption that might come in new legislation or by virtue of holding federal fintech
charters.
1. Enhanced Coordination in Licensure and Supervision—the CSBS Vision 2020
Approach
In its May 2017 Vision 2020 announcement, the CSBS set forth a goal that “[b]y
2020, state regulators will adopt an integrated, 50-state licensing and supervisory
system, leveraging technology and smart regulatory policy to transform the interaction
between industry, regulators and consumers.”83 In February 2018, the CSBS launched
a pilot program to increase harmonization of licensing and other regulatory
requirements and examinations of non-depository providers of consumer financial
services licensed by states, including agreements by seven states to accept licensing
findings of other states.84
The CSBS issued a report on its efforts in June 2018. 85 That report identified
“common goals shared between regulators and the industry that will help guide
improvements to the state supervisory process.”86 These included efforts to “support
innovation and startups, enable national scale, strengthen the financial system, and
uphold important consumer protections.”87 In August 2018, the CSBS issued an

81

CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS NATIONWIDE ADOPT SINGLE
EXAM FOR MORTGAGE LICENSING (Aug. 8, 2018), https://www.csbs.org/state-regulatorsnationwide-adopt-single-exam-mortgage-licensing.
82

Id.

83 CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, VISION 2020 FOR FINTECH AND NON-BANK
REGULATION (May 10, 2017), https://www.csbs.org/csbs-announces-vision-2020-fintech-andnon-bank-regulation.
84 CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, STATE REGULATORS TAKE FIRST STEP TO
STANDARDIZE LICENSING PRACTICES FOR FINTECH PAYMENTS (Feb. 6, 2018),
https://www.csbs.org/state-regulators-take-first-step-standardize-licensing-practices-fintechpayments (participating states include Georgia, Illinois, Kansas, Massachusetts, Tennessee,
Texas and Washington).
85

CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, VISION 2020 FOR FINTECH AND NON-BANK
REGULATION (June 7, 2018) [hereinafter JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT],
https://www.csbs.org/vision2020.
86

Id. at 3.

87

Id.
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additional update reporting on progress and describing its next steps.88 In the August
2018 report, the CSBS announced that 84 percent of the states were using the NMLS
for money transmitter licensing. 89
Strong participation in the NMLS by states that require licenses for money
transmission and money services businesses is certainly a huge step forward in
streamlining the license application processes for fintech and other non-bank
businesses. The NLMS or other methods to share information from license
applications, as forward-thinking as the CSBS plans and admirable all-around, do not
address two significant issues: (1) the variations of coverage in state laws governing
virtual-currency businesses and (2) the attendant risks of being prosecuted as an
unlicensed provider by a state whose money transmission or money services laws
cover virtual-currency services as money transmission or money services, or, more
significantly, for a failure to hold a license and to register with the Department of the
Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”) as a “money services
business” for which liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960 does not have a scienter
requirement.90
Only a uniform law that is enacted by many states or federal preemption in a new
chartering or licensing system will address the risks that arise from non-uniform state
coverage requirements where Section 1960 liability may arise. Nevertheless, until
states enact uniform laws governing virtual-currency businesses or a federal regime is
in place, CSBS’ Vision 2020 is a significant improvement over the status quo ante.
2. State Statutory Requirements that Encourage Reciprocal Licensing Agreements
Beyond harmonization of the license application processes that the CSBS Vision
2020 project is advancing, an alternate route is direct recognition of licenses granted
by one or more states by other states, a process known as “reciprocity.” The ULC’s
Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act responds to two concerns
that CSBS identified in today’s 50-state licensure requirements impose on entrants to
the fintech business marketplace: lack of clarity about whether businesses need
licenses in some jurisdictions and duplicative or overlapping license processing
requirements.91
The ULC offered two alternative ways to achieve reciprocity in Article 2 of the
URVCBA.92 The ULC’s URVCBA first encourages the use by states of the
Nationwide Multistate Licensing System (“NMLS”)93 to permit reciprocal licensing—
an approach not included in CSBS’ Vision 2020 Project.94 In the following excerpt,
88
CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, CSBS VISION 2020: PROGRESS UPDATE (Aug. 2,
2018) [hereinafter AUGUST 2018 CSBS PROGRESS UPDATE], https://www.csbs.org/csbs-vision2020-progress-update.
89

Id. (referencing point three of the report).

90

18 U.S.C. § 1960 (2016).

91

See JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85.

92

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203.

93

CONF. OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, NATIONWIDE MULTISTATE LICENSING SYSTEM,
https://www.csbs.org/nationwide-multistate-licensing-system (last visited Oct. 1, 2018)
(explaining that NMLS does not grant or deny licenses).
94

JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85.
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the term “registry” specifically refers to the NMLS because of the definition in the
URVCBA’s Section 102(15).95 Section 203 of the URVCBA provides:
SECTION 203. LICENSE BY RECIPROCITY.
Alternative A
(a) Instead of an application required by Section 202, a person licensed by
another state to conduct virtual-currency business activity in that state may
file with the registry an application under this section.
(b) When an application under this section is filed with the registry, the
applicant shall notify the department in a record that the applicant has
submitted the application to the registry and shall submit to the department:
(1) a certification of license history from the agency responsible for
issuing a license in each state in which the applicant has been licensed
to conduct virtual-currency business activity;
(2) a nonrefundable reciprocal licensing application fee in the amount
[required by law of this state other than this [act]or specified by the
department by rule];
(3) documentation demonstrating that the applicant complies with the
security and net worth reserve requirements of Section 204; and
(4) a certification signed by an executive officer of the applicant
affirming that the applicant will conduct its virtual-currency business
activity with or on behalf of a resident in compliance with this [act].
(c) The department may permit conduct of virtual-currency business
activity by an applicant that complies with this section.96
Comment 4 to URVCBA Section 203 makes clear that the NMLS and Registry is
the preferred mechanism for “submission and management of reciprocal licensure
applications” under the URVCBA.97 The unique addition in Section 203 is its position
that reciprocal licensure by states is a good approach for the prudential regulation of
virtual-currency businesses by the states.
The other option that URVCBA Section 203 suggests is more limited legislative
authority for bilateral or multilateral reciprocity based on the assessment by state
banking commissioners or departments that other states have licensure requirements
comparable to their states’ requirements. 98 For this reason, URVCBA Section 203
includes an alternative way to authorize reciprocity:
Alternative B

95

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 102(15).

96

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative A.

97

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 cmt. 4.

98

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative B(a)(1).
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(a) A person licensed by another state to engage in virtual-currency business
activity in that state may engage in virtual-currency business activity with or
on behalf of a resident to the same extent as a licensee if:
(1) the department determines that the state in which the person is
licensed has in force laws regulating virtual-currency business activity
which are substantially similar to, or more protective of rights of users
than, this [act];
(2) at least 30 days before the person commences virtual-currency
business activity with or on behalf of a resident, the person submits to
the department:
(A) notice containing:
(i) a statement that the person will rely on reciprocal
licensing;
(ii) a copy of the license to conduct virtual-currency
business activity issued by the other state; and
(iii) a certification of license history from the agency
responsible for issuing the license to conduct virtualcurrency business activity in the other state;
(B) a nonrefundable reciprocal license fee in the amount [required
by law of this state other than this [act] or specified by the
department by rule];
(C) documentation demonstrating that the applicant complies with the
security and net worth reserve requirements of Section 204; and
(D) a certification signed by an executive officer of the applicant
affirming that the applicant will conduct its virtual-currency business
activity with or on behalf of a resident in compliance with this [act];
(3) subject to subsection (b), the department does not deny the
application not later than [15] days after receipt of the items submitted
under paragraph (2); and
(4) subject to subsection (b), the applicant does not commence virtualcurrency business activity with or on behalf of a resident until at least 31
days after complying with paragraph (2).99
The approaches offered in the URVCBA go beyond the scope of CSBS’ Vision
2020 project. The URVCBA offers legislative authority for reciprocal licensing; the
CSBS approach so far only allows sharing of license application information and
investigatory results. These are no small achievements, but far less than legislative
99

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203 Alternative B.
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authority allowing true reciprocity.100 Still, both the URVCBA and CSBS’ Vision
2020 are efforts to reduce friction in the initial licensure and later supervision of
virtual-currency businesses.101
E. “Regulatory Sandboxes” Based on Prior Approval to Operate and Other
“Sandbox” Options—Arizona, the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, and
the Uniform Regulation of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act
“Regulatory sandboxes” allow innovators in fintech, blockchain, and
cryptocurrencies the ability to operate with the need for full licensure on a trial basis,
but the criteria used to determine eligibility or the need for approval prior to operations
may differ.102 In some foreign nations, a “regulatory sandbox license” is required. 103
1. Arizona’s 2018 Regulatory Sandbox Legislation
Arizona became the first U.S. state to authorize a regulatory sandbox when its
governor signed House Bill 2434 on March 23, 2018.104 The new program was
approved for launch on July 1, 2018.105 Authority for the regulatory sandbox program
ends on July 1, 2028.106
The legislation offers—on a prior approval basis only—applicants a 24-month
period107 in which a fintech company can engage in transactions with Arizona
residents without obtaining full licensure to operate.108 Other features of Arizona’s
sandbox program are important to note. First, all customers of the approved companies
must be residents of Arizona109 and the legislation caps the number of customers an
approved company may serve.110 If the company is testing products or services as a
money transmitter, as that term is defined in Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 6-1201, the sandbox
legislation limits individual transactions per consumer to $2,500, and aggregate
transactions per consumer to not more than $25,000.111 The Arizona Attorney General
may authorize holders of money transmitter sandbox approvals to deal with as many
as 17,500 consumers, with a $15,000 limit per transaction and an aggregate limit of
100

JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note 85.

101

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 203; JUNE 2018 CSBS VISION REPORT, supra note

85.
102

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., supra note 52.

103

See, e.g., BOARD OF INVESTMENT MAURITIUS, REGULATORY SANDBOX LICENSE,
www.investmauritius.com/schemes/rsl.aspx.
104

Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release, supra note 71, at 1.

105

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 41-5612, 41-3102 (2018).

106

Id.

107

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(A)(1) (2018).

108

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §41-5601(6); Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release,
supra note 71, at 1.
109

Ariz. Rev. Stat. Title 41, Ch. 55, § 41-5605(B)(1) (2018).

110

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(2) (2018) (capping at 10,000 consumers the
authority under the sandbox program for participating companies).
111

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(4) (2018).
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$50,000 per consumer, if the sandbox applicant demonstrates “adequate financial
capitalization, risk management process and management oversight.”112 The
participating companies must comply with Arizona’s Consumer Fraud Act 113 and all
statutory limits and caps in Arizona law related to financial transactions. 114 Arizona
House Bill 2434 also allows firms to test new products in a regulatory sandbox for
which they do not already have permission from the State. 115
The sandbox will be administered by the Office of Arizona’s Attorney General, 116
not by its traditional regulator of non-depository providers. A key feature is the grant
of discretion to the Arizona Attorney General to deny applications.117 Denials are
explicitly not appealable agency actions.118
2. The Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’s Global Financial Innovation
Network
Another regulatory sandbox may result from the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection’s Global Financial Innovation Network, which was announced in August
2018.119 The Bureau announced its global regulator partners, including the United
Kingdom’s Financial Conduct Authority, Abu Dhabi Global Markets, Autorité des
marches financiers (Québec), Australian Securities & Investments Commission,
Central Bank of Bahrain, Dubai Financial Services Authority Guernsey Financial
Services Commission, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, Monetary Authority of
Singapore, Ontario Securities Commission, and Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
(CGAP).120 This program is not limited to participants offering virtual-currency
products and services.
The BCFP issued a draft document describing aspects of the collaboration in which
it expects to participate that, among other things, specifically mentions providing
“firms with an environment in which to trial cross-border solutions.”121 The draft sets
forth common objectives found in global regulatory sandbox programs, including:
supporting financial innovation and fintech firms offering new products, services, or
business models; fostering a financial services system that is “more efficient and
manages risks more effectively;” understanding how emerging technologies and
business models “interact with the regulatory framework and where it may lead to
112

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(C)(1)-(2) (2018).

113

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1521-1534 (2018).

114

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5605(B)(3) (2018).

115

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-41-5603(D) (2018).

116

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5602 (2018).

117

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-5603(J) (2018).

118

Id.

119

BCFP Global Network Press Release, supra note 12.

120

Id. at 2.

121

Id. at 1; BUR. OF CONS. FIN. PROT., GLOBAL FINANCE INNOVATION NETWORK:
CONSULTATION DOCUMENT (2018) [hereinafter BCFP CONSULTATION DOCUMENT],
https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/bcfp_global-financial-innovationnetwork_consultation-document.pdf. Comments on the document are due by October 14, 2018.
See BCFP Global Network Press Release, supra note 12, at 2.
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barriers to entry,” promoting “effective competition in the interest of consumers;” and
promoting “financial inclusion for consumers.” 122 The document also defines the
testing that sandbox firms may engage in as “either on a virtual basis with data sets,
or in a love market with real consumers or market participants.” 123
3. Threshold-Based Exemptions from Full-Licensure or Activity Exclusions from
Licensure Requirements under the Uniform Law Commission’s Uniform Regulation
of Virtual-Currency Businesses Act—Another Key Part of the Uniform Law
Commission’s Approach
A different type of regulatory environment or “sandbox” that permits testing of
new products and services among virtual-currency businesses is the ULC’s
combination of activity exclusions and threshold-basis exemptions from full licensure
embedded in its URVCBA.124 First, the URVCBA defines “virtual-currency business
activity” as:
(A) exchanging, transferring, or storing virtual currency or engaging in
virtual-currency administration, whether directly or through an agreement
with a virtual-currency control-services vendor;
(B) holding electronic precious metals or electronic certificates
representing interests in precious metals on behalf of another person or
issuing shares or electronic certificates representing interests in precious
metals; or
(C) exchanging one or more digital representations of value used within
one or more online games, game platforms, or family of games for:
(i) virtual currency offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from
which the original digital representation of value was received; or
(ii) legal tender or bank credit outside the online game, game platform,
or family of games offered by or on behalf of the same publisher from
which the original digital representation of value was received.125
That definition, in turn, depends on the scope of the term “virtual currency,” which
is defined as:
(A) means a digital representation of value that:
(i) is used as a medium of exchange, unit of account, or store of value;
and
(ii) is not legal tender, whether or not denominated in legal tender; and

122

BCFP CONSULTATION DOCUMENT, supra note 121.

123

Id. at 17.

124

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 201.

125

Id. § 102(25).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8

18

58

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:40

(B) does not include:
(i) a transaction in which a merchant grants, as part of an affinity or
rewards program, value that cannot be taken from or exchanged with
the merchant for legal tender, bank credit, or virtual currency; or
(ii) a digital representation of value issued by or on behalf of a publisher
and used solely within an online game, game platform, or family of
games sold by the same publisher or offered on the same game
platform.126
Additionally, the URVCBA has two threshold-based exemptions from full
licensure.127 For providers “whose virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf
of residents is reasonably expected to be valued, in the aggregate, on an annual basis
at $5,000 or less, measured by the U.S. Dollar equivalent of virtual currency,”128 the
exemption is absolute.129 For providers whose activity is $5,000 or less with residents
of the enacting state up less than $35,000 on an annual basis measured in the same
manner, the act requires “registration” with the enacting state and compliance with
substantive provisions of the act. 130 As Comment 2 to URVCBA Section 103
explains:
This act sets the full-licensure threshold at an annual transaction volume of
$35,000 or more in the U.S. Dollar equivalent with residents of an enacting
state. This figure is intended to allow some “in the wild” testing of the
products and services in the enacting state. When aggregated with the same
threshold in other states that enact this act, this threshold is intended to
allow room for market- and function- testing virtual-currency products or
services involved on a modest basis in more than one enacting state without
first needing to hold a license from each of those states. 131
Section 207 of the URVCBA sets forth the requirements for those seeking to
operate under the “registration” option below full-licensure status only if
“registrants” can fulfill the requirements of Subsection 207(a):
SECTION 207. REGISTRATION IN LIEU OF LICENSE.
(a) A person whose volume of virtual-currency business activity in U.S.
Dollar equivalent of virtual currency will not exceed $35,000 annually may
engage in virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf of a resident
under a registration without first obtaining a license under this [act] if the
person:

126

Id. § 102(23).

127

Id. § 207.

128

Id. §103(b)(8).

129

Id. § 207 cmt. 4.

130

Id.

131

Id. § 103 cmt. 2.
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(1) files with the department a notice in the form and medium prescribed
by the department of its intention to engage in virtual-currency business
activity with or on behalf of a resident;
(2) provides the information for an investigation under Section 202;
(3) states the anticipated virtual-currency business activity for its next
fiscal quarter;
(4) pays the department a registration fee in the amount [required by
law of this state other than this [act] or specified by the department by
rule];
(5) if required to register with the Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network of the United States Department of the Treasury as a moneyservice business, provides the department evidence of the registration;
(6) provides evidence that the person has policies and procedures to
comply with the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. Section 5311 et seq. [, as
amended], and other applicable laws;
(7) describes the source of funds and credit to be used by the person to
conduct virtual-currency business activity with or on behalf of a resident
and provides evidence of and agrees to maintain the minimum net worth
and reserves required by Section 204 and sufficient unencumbered
reserves for winding down operations;
(8) provides the department with evidence that the person has in place
policies and procedures to comply with [Articles] 3, 5, and 6 and other
provisions of this [act] designated by the department; and
(9) provides the department with a copy of its most recent financial
statement, whether reviewed or audited.132
URVCBA subsection 207(b) also addresses the duration of a registrant’s
permission to operate without a full license by requiring a license application “before”
the registrant’s “virtual-currency business activity . . . with or on behalf of residents
exceeds $35,000 annually in U.S. Dollar equivalent of virtual currency[.]”133 It also
allows registrants to operate while their applications for licenses are pending.134
Unlike Arizona’s provision where the Attorney General must give prior approval
of sandbox applications, URVCBA Section 207 does not require any form of advance
permission, just registration, as its title suggests.135 Like Arizona’s sandbox law,
URVCBA Section 207(c) provides that registrations may be suspended or revoked
without prior hearings or opportunity to be heard.136
In addition to the dollar-equivalent cap mentioned above, URVCBA Section 207
sets outer limits of registrants’ ability to engage with residents of enacting states, viz.,
132

Id. § 207(a).

133

Id. § 207(b).

134

Id.

135

Id. § 207 cmt. 3.

136

Id. § 207(c).
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all registrations cease to be effective on the second anniversary of the date of the
registration.137 The other limits imposed follow action by the regulator in charge in the
enacting state, viz., actions that deny the registrant’s application for a license or that
suspend or revoke the registration.138
Because the registration option applies for engagement with residents in each
enacting state, and until the second anniversary of each registration, the URVCBA
affords a broader base of testing products and markets than the Arizona sandbox
allows, but the scale of activity under URVCBA Section 207 is likely to involve
fewer consumers per state because of the lower dollar-equivalency cap on activity by
“registrants.”139
F. States that Have Announced Intentions Not to Cover Virtual-Currency Businesses
at This Time
Some states have signaled their intentions not to regulate virtual-currency
businesses under existing state money-transmitter or money-services laws, including
Illinois, Kansas, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Texas.140 One state, Wisconsin,
apparently has refused to issue money-transmitter licenses to virtual-currency business
providers.141
This “non-regulation” approach is one that many providers will like. But, it comes
with a potential cost: the fact that a state does not require a license or other approval
or registration of providers seeking to engage with residents of that state may keep
providers from recognizing that they still have federal compliance obligations under
guidance issued by the Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement
Network (“FinCEN”) under regulations it enforces,142 and from appreciating their
potential liability under 18 U.S.C. § 1960. Additionally, providers in these states will
have compliance responsibilities under statutes, regulations, and Executive Orders
enforced by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control.143 Thus, although the
upside is the ability to operate without state compliance responsibilities or application
costs, the downside of this “regulatory” approach is that it may create a false sense of
non-regulation and cause less attention to federal compliance responsibilities.

137

Id. § 207(d)(4). Note that Arizona has imposed a comparable, 24-month limit on
operations under its sandbox approvals program.
138

Id. § 207(d)(1)–(2).
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See id. § 207.
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See generally Wales, supra note 14.

See State of Wis. Dep’t of Fin. Inst., Sellers of Checks, https://www.wdfi.org/fi/ifs/soc/
(last updated Dec. 31, 2017).
141

142 Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, 31 C.F.R. §§ 1010.100–1010.980 (effective
March 1, 2011) (replacing 31 C.F.R. Part 103).
143 See U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., OFAC REGULATIONS FOR THE FINANCIAL COMMUNITY (Jan.
24,
2012),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/facbk.pdf
(containing a comprehensive listing of general and country-specific coverage up to early 2012).
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G. States that Have Not yet Regulated Virtual-Currency Providers Under MoneyTransmission or Money-Services Regimes or Have not yet Indicated Their Intention
to Do So
The no-action-yet approach covers the largest number of states in the United
States. Twenty-seven states have not amended laws or announced their intentions not
to include virtual-currency products and services under their existing moneytransmission or money-services regulatory regimes as of June 28, 2018. These states
include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, West Virginia, and Wyoming. 144 In addition,
Montana falls into this category primarily because it is the only state without a moneytransmission or money-services regulatory statute as of July 31, 2018. The District of
Columbia enacted a money-transmission statute in 2018, but it does not specifically
cover virtual-currency transactions or providers.145
The downside for virtual-currency business providers in these states are the same
as described in the previous category—that providers may fail to meet their obligations
under FinCEN’s guidance or OFAC-enforced statutes, regulations, and Executive
Orders.
III. CREATING INCUBATION OPPORTUNITIES FOR INNOVATIVE PRODUCTS AND
SERVICES
Innovators in the virtual-currency products and services community need
environments in which they can test their wares “in the wild.” That is, with real
customers. This Part of this essay explains why start-ups need a safe “location” from
which to test products and grow, such as the two-year permissioned “sandbox” option
in place in the State of Arizona since July 1, 2018146 and the dollar-limited, nonpermissioned “registration” option147 included in the Uniform Law Commission’s
URVCBA that has not been enacted or implemented in any state as of December 1,
2018.
Providers of virtual-currency payments and storage products and services need
incubator environments because they may not yet be ready either for full licensure by
states or the fintech charters that the OCC plans to offer. A recent policy update from
the law firm of Sullivan and Cromwell explains two reasons why the OCC charters
may not come to all participants in this marketplace:

144 See Wales, supra note 14. Readers should thank Mr. Wales for his comprehensive report
on the status of state regulations. Note that Mr. Wales cites a report that Oregon may be in the
classification of states that require licensure as of June 28, 2018, even if there is no publicly
available statute or regulation taking that position. See id. (citing Bitcoin Regulation Roundup
Regulator Divide and “Life on Bitcoin,” PYMNTS.COM (May 29, 2015),
https://www.pymnts.com/in-depth/2015/bitcoin-regulation-roundup-regulator-divide-and-lifeon-bitcoin/).
145

See Title 10 of the D.C. Code, Chapter 10, § 26: Money Transmissions (2018).

146

Arizona AG Regulatory Sandbox Press Release, supra note 71, at 2.

147

UNIF. L. COMM’N, supra note 16, at § 207.
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[I]t is unclear whether a special purpose national bank charter will be a
viable option for certain fintech companies, as some startup or early-stage
fintech companies may not be able to satisfy many of the baseline
supervisory standards, such as those relating to capital, liquidity, and risk
management requirements. Even mature fintech companies may conclude
that a special purpose charter does not provide enough benefit to justify
compliance with a relatively burdensome federal regulatory regime. 148
Similar factors may keep some startup companies from obtaining full state
licenses. For example, since the New York State “BitLicense” regulation became
effective on August 8, 2015,149 only five companies had obtained BitLicenses as of
May 25, 2018.150 Those companies are: Circle, Ripple, Coinbase, BitFlyer, and
Genesis Global Trading.151 The last approval, of Genesis, followed a long period in
which Genesis had operated under the “safe harbor” provided to BitLicense applicants
who filed license applications before the Regulation’s August 8, 2015 effective
date.152 Presumably, the Department of Financial Services learned a great deal about
the operations and financial resilience of those applicants in the more than three years
since the BitLicense regulation became effective.
Critics of DFS’s pace of granting BitLicenses continue to charge that the
BitLicense regulator favors better-funded applicants over start-ups.153 Among these
may be the capital requirements that the regulation authorizes the Superintendent of
the Department of Financial Services to impose. 154 The Superintendent may “consider
a variety of factors” when determining the minimum capital it will impose on any
licensee, including the composition of its assets and liabilities, its expected volume of
activity, the amount of leverage it employs, and the types of products or services it
plans to offer.155 In states such as New York, the amount of the non-refundable

148 Sullivan & Crowmell LLP, Special Purpose National Bank Charters, (Aug. 3, 2018),
https://www.sullcrom.com/files/upload/SC-Publication-Special-Purpose-Fintech-NationalBank-Charters.pdf.
149

23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200 (2015).

See Jen Wieczner, Inside New York’s BitLicense Bottleneck: An ‘Absolute Failure?,’
FORTUNE (May 25, 2018), http://fortune.com/2018/05/25/bitcoin-cryptocurrency-new-yorkbitlicense/ (discussing various issues concerning BitLicense applications).
150

151

Id.
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Matthew Leising, Genesis Global Trading Granted BitLicense in New York State,
BLOOMBERG (May 17, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-05-17/genesisglobal-trading-granted-bitlicense-in-new-york-state (discussing licensing of cryptocurrency
broker, which had previously operated under BitLicense’s “safe harbor” provision).
153

Chrisjan Pauw, BitLicense Approval Shines Fresh Light on New York-Crypto
Relationship, COIN TELEGRAPH (June 1, 2018), https://cointelegraph.com/news/bitlicenseapproval-shines-fresh-light-on-new-york-crypto-relationship (mentioning how few BitLicenses
have been granted and describing an exodus from New York State by several crytpocurrency
providers despite the state’s sizeable role in financial services).
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23 N.Y. FIN. SERV. LAW § 200.8 (2015).
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Id.
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application fees and minimum capital requirements could well be beyond the reach of
many potential applicants for full licenses.156
A final reason supporting enactment of the URCVBA’s “registration” option—
and one in furtherance of Arizona’s sandbox and the “safe harbor” provided to preeffective-date applicants for BitLicenses—is that the states have long served as testing
grounds for new financial products and services. 157 As the Treasury’s 2018 Fintech
Report noted:
The United States has a long and complex history of state and federal
regulation in financial services. The U.S. banking system began through
state charters. In many ways, the state-based system acts as a laboratory of
innovation for firms, which should be preserved. In fact, the state model
has allowed for numerous nonbank firms to build a local product in a state,
and then subsequently expand as the product gained broader market
appeal.158
The report continued with a final factor favoring having provider- or productincubation capacity at the state level:
State regulators have greater proximity to their constituents and can be
more responsive to the needs and preferences of local consumers than
regulators who do not have a local presence.159
As this Part suggests, there may be many reasons why creating incubator options—
such as Arizona’s sandbox periods, the BitLicense’s “safe harbor” operations, and the
“registration” option under Section 207 of the URVCBA—is a good approach to
regulating a young, and frequently morphing community of providers of financial
services. Additional reasons stem from high application fees required for more mature
“money transmitters” or “money services businesses” and from high, ongoing capital
requirements. The small-scale testing that the URVCBA allows also can help
regulators learn about the marketplace participants and various products and services
being offered. Other benefits may attend incubators in the pursuit of informationbased economies, such as collaborations among participants.160

156 DavisPolk, New York’s Final “BitLicense” Rule: Overview and Changes From July
2014
Proposal
3
(2015),
https://www.davispolk.com/files/new_yorks_final_bitlicense_rule_overview_changes_july_2
014_proposal.pdf.
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See 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11, at 13.
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Id. at 66.
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Id.
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For a recent study of incubators and a literature review, see Hanadi Mubarak Al-Mubarak
& Michael Busler, Challenges and Opportunities of Innovation and Incubators as a Tool for
Knowledge-Based Economy, 6 J. OF INNOVATION & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 1 (Dec. 20, 2017),
https://innovation-entrepreneurship.springeropen.com/track/pdf/10.1186/s13731-017-0075-y.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol67/iss1/8

24

64

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:40

There are risks in not providing for sandboxes for fintech innovations. One
is that market participants will go elsewhere to regulate, taking intellectual property,
talent, and innovations with them.161 Another is described in the next Part of this essay.
IV. LIABILITY UNDER 18 U.S.C. § 1960
Beyond the policy reasons to use incubators or regulatory sandboxes to encourage
innovations in products and services, the most significant reason for greater clarity in
the regulation of providers of virtual-currency payment and storage products comes
from federal anti-money laundering regulations and enforcement authority. 162 The key
provision is 18 U.S.C. § 1960, which provides that the knowing conduct, control,
management, supervision, ownership, or direction of an unlicensed money
transmitting business shall be fined or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both. 163
To provide more context for why this federal criminal statute is a major reason as to
why we need regulatory sandboxes or the URVCBA’s “registration” (not licensure)
option at this point in the development of virtual-currency payments and storage
products and services, subsection (b)(1) of Section 1960 defines the term “unlicensed
money transmitting business” as one affecting interstate or foreign commerce “in any
manner or degree” and:
(A) is operated without an appropriate money transmitting license in a State
where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or a felony under
State law, whether or not the defendant knew that the operation was
required to be licensed or that the operation was so punishable;
(B) fails to comply with the money transmitting business registration
requirements under section 5330 of title 31, United States Code, or
regulations prescribed under such section; or
(C) otherwise involves the transportation or transmission of funds that are
known to the defendant to have been derived from a criminal offense or are
intended to be used to promote or support unlawful activity. 164
The key concern stems from subparagraph (A) above—that if one should have had
a license to operate a money transmitting business in a State that has prescribed a
misdemeanor or felony punishment for failure to hold such a license is vulnerable to
prosecution under section 1960, whether they knew about the requirement to have a
license.165 This provision makes it imperative to provide opportunities for innovation
without risk of federal prosecution for innocent providers. The second reason—as
described in subparagraph (b) above is that failure to register a money transmitting
business with FinCEN is a separate ground for liability. 166
161 Ernst & Young, As FinTech Evolves, Can Financial Services Innovation Be Compliant?
3 (2017), https://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/ey-the-emergence-and-impact-ofregulatory-sandboxes-in-uk-and-across-apac.pdf.
162

18 U.S.C. § 1860(a) (2016).
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18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A)–(C) (2016).
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18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(1)(A) (2016).
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V. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
A recent survey of providers of virtual-currency products and services revealed
which jurisdictions that they perceived as having the best and worst approaches to
regulating their businesses.167 The United States topped the list of the “worst
jurisdictions” and Malta topped the list of the “best jurisdictions.” 168 But, what is more
telling, is that the top answers for both categories was “none.” 169
It appears that virtual-currency businesses do not like regulation. They do not like
what is happening, or not happening, in the United States. In other times, entities that
needed physical locations could more easily avoid regulations they did not like by
either not doing business in the jurisdictions whose requirements they do not wish to
meet or changing the nature of their products and services to avoid specific
regulations.
The regulation of virtual-currency payments- and storage-product providers in the
United States shows some friction points and is beginning to offer some solutions, as
this essay has tried to explore. We have not yet reached an inflection point in
regulating virtual-currency providers.170 Indeed, the Department of the Treasury’s
report suggests that the inflection point is specifically ahead of us. The report embraces
a solution to permit “meaningful experimentation in the real world, subject to
appropriate limitations.”171 It also proposes “a unified solution” that would provide
equal access to companies in “various stages of the business lifecycle” (e.g., start-ups
and incumbents).172 The Treasury also suggests that the alternative could be a single
regulator with power to preempt the other regulators of fintech firms or an additional
regulator.173 The Treasury’s bottom-line message is clear: if the states do not move to
more uniformity in regulating providers of virtual-currency products and services in
the next few years, the Department will ask Congress to adopt a federal regulatory
scheme.174 Whether or when Congress might do so is anyone’s guess.
With the Treasury’s recently issued challenge to collaborate or be preempted, the
states should help create the space for innovation via new approaches to regulating
new entrants into these emerging payments and asset-storage businesses. States can
do this whether through more widespread enactment of uniform prudential regulatory
schemes such as the URVCBA,175 or other devices that States may authorize their non167 Nolan
Bauerle,
State
of
Blockchain
Q2
2018,
COINDESK RES.,
https://www.coindesk.com/research/state-of-blockchain-q2-2018/?slide=96 (last visited Sept.
9, 2018).
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URVCBA as a means of harmonizing state regulation of fintech companies).
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bank regulators to try, perhaps through wider use of the NMLS to streamline license
applications or other reciprocal license recognition, or sandboxes like that in Arizona.
The Treasury has offered the states a continuing role in our historical dualregulation of providers of financial services—an approach that has served us well
given differences in size, capital strength, business structure, and other features of
developing financial services providers and markets. 176 Joint regulation has worked
well through many iterations of products and business models, and through market
disruptions. The Treasury is signaling that now is the time for the states to step up or
to risk losing their ability to control which businesses may conduct transactions within
their states’ boundaries. As traditional hosts of new financial products and services,
the states should step up because regulating providers of virtual-currency products
and services is more appropriate now than attempting to regulate virtual currencies
themselves, and it is more consistent with the States’ traditional roles as regulators of
non-depository providers of financial products and services.
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See generally 2018 TREAS. FINTECH REPORT, supra note 11.
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